ABSTRACT
The omission of human dependency from the foundations of the liberal tradition’s conception of justice is indicative of the broader phenomenon that a philosopher’s lack of awareness of a set of concerns can result in their exclusion from the starting premises of the theory. It gives us a reason to build in mechanisms through which theory can make contact with what real people value. There can be various mechanisms for theories to make contact with the world, but all of them will be influenced by the quality, capacities, and values of the citizenry and, for that reason, liberal dependency care requires that existing societies support the cultivation of autonomy. Our capacity to articulate what matters to us as separate individuals is vital to a functioning society, and it is one of the necessary safeguards against deeply sedimented oppression. Uniting the work of autonomy theorist Diana Tietjens Meyers with John Stuart Mill’s earlier thought about capacities for self-determination, the chapter defends a conception of autonomy as a set of skills. It then defends the widespread possession of autonomy skills as an aim for every society seeking to be just in accordance with the theory of liberal dependency care and shows that this account of autonomy meets a set of desiderata set out in the debate between political liberals and perfectionist liberals and helps secure legitimacy of the doctrine. In doing so, the chapter also canvases a taxonomy used for personal autonomy theory that includes procedural autonomy and substantive autonomy.
