ABSTRACT
The chapter explores a variety of theoretical perspectives on the variables which block and facilitate organisational learning during conflict. In doing so, it examines the insights of theory about whether, and to what extent, the model of lessons learned best practice identified in Chapter 1 can be implemented. The chapter identifies four main approaches to the sources of military change: organisation theory, bureaucratic politics, cultural approaches and finally, neoclassical realism. It highlights that organisation theory, bureaucratic politics and cultural approaches underplay the importance of ‘bottom-up’ adaptation as a source of military change. They provide, albeit to differing degrees, limited space for the role of bottom-up military learning in driving innovation. Consequently, these approaches are characterised by a significant degree of scepticism about the ability of militaries to implement the key principles of best practice in military learning identified in Chapter 1.
Nevertheless, it argues that organisation theory, bureaucratic politics and cultural approaches offer useful perspectives on the sources of LL and dynamic organisational capabilities by providing the opportunity to explore the political processes both endogenous and exogenous to militaries which can facilitate, but on the whole hinder, the development of dynamic organisational capabilities and effective LL. The chapter develops six hypotheses about the sources of military learning which will be examined in the empirical case studies. However, it argues that neoclassical realism provides the strongest framework for understanding the conditions under which effective dynamic organisational capabilities develop. This analytical leverage derives from the theory’s ability to account for a wider range of variables which enable and hinder the development of LL.
