ABSTRACT
This chapter explores knowledge transformation in the British Army during operations in Helmand Province: the ability of the Army to effectively combine new knowledge deriving from intra- and inter-organisational learning with existing organisational knowledge. It focuses, in particular, on the Army’s ability to recalibrate operational design, training, officer education and doctrine to the demands of Afghanistan and the impact of lessons learned on this recalibration. The chapter finds that the Army’s Lessons Exploitation Centre (LXC) played an important role in enabling the Army to effectively combine new and existing organisational knowledge at the tactical level. However, the Afghan Counterinsurgency Centre, LXC and Permanent Joint Headquarters were able to exert limited influence over military activity at the higher-tactical and operational levels. While Army Counterinsurgency doctrine remained largely fit-for-purpose throughout the Helmand campaign, operational design, training and officer education struggled to keep pace with the challenges of the operational environment.
