ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the variables which facilitated and impeded the establishment of knowledge transformation capability and which affected the performance of lessons learned (LL) in the recalibration of operational design, doctrine, training and officer education. It demonstrates that knowledge transformation at the tactical level met with relatively limited resistance from organisational culture and bureaucratic politics. Instead, the threat of defeat, combined with the implementation of key principles of best practice in knowledge transformation helped to drive the development of a strong culture of creativity and experimentation within the Army at the tactical level during Operation Herrick.
However, the chapter finds that strategic culture, organisational culture, bureaucratic politics and the fear of potential loss of personal reputation formed powerful forces which militated against the establishment of best practice in knowledge acquisition, management, dissemination and transformation at the higher-tactical and operational levels. Furthermore, the chapter finds that despite post-Herrick MoD-led efforts to improve learning, the Army and Joint environments continue to suffer deficits in their culture of experimentation and creativity and remain a long way from implementing LL best practice at the higher-tactical and operational levels. The chapter concludes by examining the theoretical implications of the British case study and the key steps which need to be taken to improve learning within the British Army and Joint environment.
