ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the factors which affected the establishment of knowledge transformation capability within the German Army and the performance of lessons learned (LL) in the recalibration of operational design, doctrine, training and officer education. It finds that knowledge transformation at the tactical level met significant resistance from organisational culture and bureaucratic politics. Strategic culture, organisational culture and bureaucratic politics also fatally undermined the establishment of best practice in knowledge acquisition, management, dissemination and transformation at the higher-tactical and operational levels. The chapter finds that strategic culture, organisational culture and bureaucratic politics created an environment characterised by a very poor culture of experimentation and creativity which did not tolerate dissent to existing orthodoxies. These variables provided a highly unsupportive context for the development of LL best practice that could expose operational design, training, doctrine and officer education to critical perspectives. The conclusions make several recommendations for changes to the Bundeswehr’s dynamic organisational capabilities, which will be essential in improving the effectiveness of LL.
