Introduction

Characteristic of twentieth century thought is a fragmentation of disciplines, a challenging of dogmatisms, and a loss of cohesion. This is generally interpreted as a crisis of philosophy and the social sciences. For Marxists, the concept of crisis has always been central, but the attenuation of the crisis at the political level appears to threaten the impetus for revolutionary action. The crisis in Marxist theory is reflected among radicals in retrenchment and internecine conflict. One response from radical theoreticians has been the development of phenomenological Marxism. Because many theoretical difficulties are unresolved, the efforts of the phenomenological Marxists to give new directions to Marxist theory have not been consolidated. Not only has the potential of phenomenological Marxism as a tool of analysis been unfulfilled, but its programmatic implications are as yet unrealised. This is owing, in part, to problems with the interpretation of Husserl’s work. Also, there is a tendency for neo-orthodox Marxists to dismiss phenomenological Marxism as a simplistic humanism, revisionist and incompatible with Marxist science. It is my intention to enquire into these theoretical difficulties which are impeding advances in phenomenological Marxism. This enquiry raises the further problem of relating two apparently disparate philosophical perspectives. The book is organised to allow both theoretical and meta-theoretical discussion of these questions to run parallel. In this way I hope to combine a critique of current Marxist theory with an exploration of problems germane to other aspects of the philosophy of the social sciences.