ABSTRACT
This chapter is concerned with the idea that the transition between incommensurable theories involves significant change of reference. It presents Paul Feyerabend's position on radical reference change and shows concerns Thomas Kuhn's original position. The chapter examines Feyerabend's argument that the concept of impetus is incommensurable with the concepts of Newtonian physics. The problem is that continuity of reference at the observational level is inconsistent with discontinuity of reference between incommensurable theories. It will be shown that Feyerabend is committed to referential discontinuity, so the conflict is genuine. Kuhn's views have changed and several stages in the development of his position on reference change may be distinguished. Singular descriptive reference is a complication which yields little further ground for referential discontinuity. Kuhn's position may be further developed by placing more emphasis on the causal theory of reference and drawing a connection between centrality and Quinean unrevisability.
