ABSTRACT
This chapter introduces the idealist interpretation and discusses the requisite notion of idealism. It argues that Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend are committed to a unique reality which is invariant between theories; hence the "world-change" image is to be taken figuratively. The chapter also discusses that the extent to which their treatment of reference is idealist. Thus the switch between the "worlds" of incommensurable theories is mediated at the psychological level by a shift of gestalt. That theories should design their own referents in this way constitutes the idealism inherent in this way of handling reference. Feyerabend's view of radical change of reference lacks this crucial idealist assumption of successful reference. Feyerabend is led to the idealist conclusion that incommensurable theories refer to different worlds because such theories never make sense together". On the local idealist construal of this suggestion, mental intervention brings about the requisite changes in the structure of the world.
