ABSTRACT
This “Introduction” chapter addresses the key conceptual and methodological challenges to examining China policy in the United States in the period 1941-1963. It outlines specifically the junctures between perception and image and the role of normative theoretical reasoning in decision-making at the elite level in the United States government on China policy. Addressing the research agenda, the chapter brings attention to the core questions still lingering on the conduct of Washington’s leaders concerning China during this time. At the most basic level, what role did information play in the construction of China assumptions, and how were adopted images and assumptions within each administration interpreted by decision-makers as means for policy formation? Specific to this analysis is the role played by perception and historical analogy and its relationship with presidential administration management strategies. The chapter introduces the concept of “operational codes” as an explanatory framework for understanding this dynamic. What is suggested is that whether or not misperception occurred was largely affected by the extent to which each administration was either opened or closed to new information. Politics, to be sure, played a role. But the role of the decision-maker and their worldview were largely determinative.
