ABSTRACT
This chapter assesses the Truman administration’s developing China policies in the State Department under the stewardship of Dean Acheson. By 1949, the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union had come to envelop and shape the thinking about Washington’s policies toward China and the emerging Communist regime in Beijing. These thoughts manifested in the National Security Council document (NSC) 68, designed to meet the emerging threat of Soviet conventional arms buildup in Europe. It is illustrated that, while accepted, the assumptions of NSC 68 did not fit well with Acheson’s attempt to recognize the People’s Republic of China or his beliefs about the Beijing regime. The divorce between information and analysis and China increased as war ignited on the Korean Peninsula in June 1950. Under the strain of the crisis, Acheson was forced to jettison his support for a more nuanced China policy. Soviet capabilities and a misguided overconfidence in US military power became the yardstick by which Chinese intervention was assessed and discounted. Unwatchful of Chinese attitudes and actions, both Acheson and General Douglas MacArthur downplayed Chinese intentions and overlooked Chinese signaling as information and intelligence were depressed.
