ABSTRACT
The conclusion chapter synthesizes the four administrations of Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy and contrasts the different styles of leadership and their impact on China policy making. More specifically, it draws attention to administration learning curves and the inability to draw coherent lessons on China policy as a means for avoiding policy failure and, ultimately, war. As the chapter further illustrates, no two administrations shared an equal appreciation for the political and economic troubles of China, though all accepted, with the exception of Truman, unnuanced ideas about how China should act and behave. It is demonstrated that each administration shared in these ideas, with little distinction made between policies pursued and the images these policies projected. As the Cold War emerged, differences between intelligence and information on the one hand and policy on the other diverged, occasionally sharply, to a point that misperception and miscommunication became commonplace. On a scale between peace and war, the White House hovered often close to the precipice, judging actions on the basis of signals misunderstood, in the face of lessons overlooked, and from information misjudged.
