ABSTRACT
How can we explain the variation in the incidence of post-election violence by political actors across Africa and within African countries? This book seeks to answer this question by exploring the effect of the judiciary on post-election violence among African countries. Specifically, under what conditions is the judiciary’s level of independence more likely to affect how both the incumbent and the challenger strategically employ political violence after elections? My findings suggest that variation in levels of judicial independence from a non-independent judiciary to a quasi-independent judiciary or from a fully independent judiciary to quasi-independent judiciary increases the likelihood of strategic use of post-election violence by non-state actors. However, the likelihood of post-election violence is significantly reduced in non-independent judiciaries or once countries’ judiciaries become fully independent. This book makes the theoretical argument that, within unconsolidated states, non-state actors that view the judiciary as quasi-independent are more likely to engage in post-election violence with the purpose of creating political and professional uncertainty in order to influence assertive behavior from judges in disputed elections. Consequently, quasi-independent judiciaries or judiciaries that are neither fully controlled by the incumbent nor fully independent from the incumbent can help explain post-election violence among unconsolidated states, all else being equal.
