ABSTRACT
Between 1990 and 2012, African countries conducted 390 elections characterized as competitive for electoral democracies. Out of the 390 elections rounds, 132 elections experienced significant levels of pre-election violence while 91 elections experienced major post-election violence. Interestingly, countries with a judicial independence threshold above 50 percent within this time period have conducted 42 rounds of elections since 1990 but experienced very low levels of post-election violence. Losers in executive elections in these regimes either graciously accepted defeat or where the outcome was contested, the aggrieved parties took their petition to court without engaging in post-election violence. Similarly, countries with low judicial independence and under heavy incumbent control also experienced little post-election violence. However, countries that accounted for most of the post-election violence within this time period were under quasi-independent judiciaries. These judiciaries were neither dependent on the government nor independent from the government. Disputed presidential elections degenerated into post-election violence in Ethiopia in (2005), Nigeria in (2007), Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in (2008), Ivory Coast in (2010) and Gabon in 2016. How can we explain the variation in the incidence of post-election violence by political actors across Africa and within countries? Spatially, why are African countries with quasi-independent judiciaries more likely to experience post-election violence compared to African countries that either have dependent or independent judiciaries? Temporally, why do some election rounds experience post-election violence while other rounds do not?
