ABSTRACT
The challenger is more likely to use violence strategically in the post-election period rather than the pre-election period. Unlike the incumbent, the challenger does not possess coercive capabilities, for instance, control of the security apparatus with which to disenfranchise voters. Engaging in pre-election violence will most likely depress voter turnout and possibly risk being disqualified from the contest. Subsequently, the challenger will more likely employ persuasion to maximize voter turnout in the pre-election period instead of violence but is more likely to employ violence during the post-election period after the ballots are cast so as not to risk suppressing voter turnout. Specifically, the challenger can use post-election violence strategically in reaction to a disputed election outcome precisely to influence assertive and impartial judicial behavior. For the challenger, nullifying the election or ordering a recount of the votes by the judiciary provides him a fresh stab at getting power. In this chapter, I proceed with the empirical analysis using a negative binomial regression with robust standard errors to model the effect of judicial independence on the number of post-election violence events by the incumbent and the challenger.
