ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I examine a case that shares similarities with Kenya but has not had challenger-induced post-election violence even when elections have been deemed fraudulent by the challengers and election observers. Consistent with the main case study, I employ a most similar approach. The chapter suggests that the similarities between Kenya and Uganda notwithstanding, the absence of post-election violence in Uganda by presidential election losers can be explained by a dependent judiciary that is more interested in maintaining the status quo than strategically defecting when faced with cases that threaten the power of the executive. The lack of constraints on the executive by the legislature and the judicial service commission signal to judges that it is costly to strategically defect and be impartial than to maintain the status quo. Similarly, the challengers are less likely to engage in post-election violence in order to create conditions of political and professional uncertainty to force judges to defect because the likelihood of defection is very low under these conditions. Subsequently, the utility of strategic use of post-election violence is low for the challengers in Uganda.
