ABSTRACT
Israel perceived that UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had been imposed by President Jimmy Carter prematurely and without Israel’s case being heard. In discussions on a proposed UN force for southern Lebanon—even before the Litani Operation—Israel had in mind some form of disengagement arrangement whereby the UN force controlled up to the Litani River. The recriminations between UNIFIL and Israel, and the UNIFIL command’s resentment of its undeserved reputation for ineffectiveness were almost inevitable. Although UNIFIL got consistently bad press in Israel, the private assessment of many military correspondents, academics, and even certain officials speaking off the record has been much more favorable. The controversy between Israel and UNIFIL over perceptions of events, the mandate, and effectiveness thus stemmed mainly from differing, indeed contradictory, notions of UNIFIL’s role vis-a-vis Israel’s security needs.
