ABSTRACT
The atomic bomb magnified the dynamism of modern strategy, which had been scarred by city bombing, poison gas, and "total war". Americans assumed that the technology of nuclear systems had reached an evolutionary plateau and that the US nuclear advantage could, conceivably, be extended forever. Nuclear forces resembled the Roman god Janus, with one face looking to war, and one to peace. Impending superpower rapprochement made nuclear deterrence based on American strategic advantage look passe. The struggle for power within the arms-control community after 1975 can be traced to domestic stresses and to Soviet behavior, which chafed away at pragmatist policies of nuclear deterrence. Pragmatist efforts at strategic modernization crumbled from public pressures unintentionally created by detente and purifier political lobbies, which slowed attempts to modernize America's aging nuclear arsenal. Largely as a function of internecine political combat over Vietnam policy, the challenge to pragmatist strategy emerged first in the Democratic party.
