ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the limitations of the verification regime. Detection and verification provide deterrence as well as reassurance to participants in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In the case of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and, in particular, safeguards, there have been serious deficiencies in detection and verification, most clearly in the case of Iraq. In 1969, Iraq ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and later, in 1972, signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iraq tried to prevent UN and IAEA inspectors from visiting sites that were part of its secret nuclear program. IAEA inspectors argued repeatedly that a nonconfrontational attitude must be maintained toward Iraq because the IAEA needed to have a long-term relationship with Iraq. Iraq’s intransigence and hostile attitude did affect the inspections. In July 1992, Iraq declared that the UN could not inspect its Ministry of Agriculture building.
