ABSTRACT
In 1992, the United States placed new limits on its nuclear testing. Nuclear testing is required to assure the systems will operate under such exposure; the requisite testing cannot be simulated. Deterrence depends on convincing the adversary that retaliation is credible. Many proponents of nuclear nonproliferation advocate a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). Principal arguments are that a CTB would: reduce proliferanti motives to acquire nuclear weapons; prevent modernization and improvement of nuclear weapons, thus contributing to disarmament; and fulfill an obligation of nuclear weapons states party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which will strengthen the treaty regime. Without testing, a large proportion of the current stockpile in either country could be rendered ineffective if just one device design were to be faulty. A CTB will impinge on the existing nuclear weapons states’ confidence in their stockpiles and can limit their abilities to improve safety and security and to develop technologies to disable terrorist nuclear weapons.
