ABSTRACT
This chapter describes International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspections as they traditionally have been conceived and applied, together with a critique of why they are insufficient. It examines the concept of “special inspections” as well as efforts now underway to improve the ability of safeguards to detect clandestine programs like those in Iraq. When it reaffirmed the right of special inspections, “The Board further reaffirmed the Agency’s rights to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency’s Statute and all comprehensive safeguards agreements.” To help countries demonstrate their good faith and compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the IAEA is developing new safeguards approaches that will not have to rely on adversarial special inspections or on orchestrating invited inspections. Routine inspections would not be diminished on sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle where highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium might be produced, stored, or used.
