ABSTRACT
The conclusions arrived at here must be viewed in terms of the caveats expressed. Access to information about some terrorist episodes was extensive, while on others it was minimal. Without coverage of the foreign language press, a task far in excess of this undertaking, and without corresponding details from officials who were involved in the whole range of specific episodes, an unobtainable commodity because of resource and security considerations, the exposure to the universe of existent information is limited. The inferences made, conclusions drawn, and policies recommended are of necessity shaped by one's exposure to information, and the extent to which any of this is representative of the universe of information is unknown. The expression of such qualifications is not to detract from the findings but to place them in a perspective mandated by legitimate concerns for objective scholarship. Consequently, given the ever-changing nature of terrorist operations, and the considerations expressed above, scholars and decision makers will have to assess the observations drawn from this research in light of those caveats and their own experiences— recalling all the time that every hostage situation and terrorist operation, in addition to its general aspects, contains unique situational considerations. The application of any general guidelines must be weighed against the unique aspects of a given situation.
