ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the various facets of Cordell Hull's contribution to the decision-making process. In Hull's view, since the latter half of the nineteenth century Japan as a power had displayed a cynical approach toward international agreements. In E. George's terminology, despite Hull's philosophical beliefs, which reflected an irreconcilable animosity toward the Japanese opponent, he was motivated—on the instrumental, practical level—by a cluster of constraints which dictated a patient and reserved operational code. The dangers inherent in a policy of harsh economic sanctions against Japan were recognized by Hull as early as November 1937. Hull's basic caution as well as his "aversion to a showdown" in the Pacific were reinforced by his belief in the innate human capacity to undergo drastic behavioral transformation. Hull's decision to incorporate his general, abstract principles into a short-term political scheme, namely, the "Ten Point Plan" made him, at long last, a natural partner to the hard-line coalition, and thus further aggravated a tense situation.
