ABSTRACT

This chapter examines how the escalating conflict in southern Africa exacerbated the contradictions in the US policy structure. The region became a high priority for the Ford/Kissinger administration as well as the Democratic administration of Jimmy Carter. Aside from continuing to provide the Portuguese with economic and military aid, Washington took little notice of the nationalist insurgencies that were slowly building popular bases in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau. An interagency task force on Angola, headed by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Nathaniel Davis, grasped this dilemma and recommended that Washington Dursue the diplomatic rather than the military option. The Armed Forces Movement coup in Portugal effectively removed one of Washington's main class allies in southern Africa. Starting from this weak position, US policy in the Angolan crisis was also saddled with an operational arm, the Central Intelligence Agency, that was incapable of representing US national interests.