ABSTRACT
War is a test of the extent to which an army serves its purpose. Wars involve clash of combat doctrines, tactics, organization and structure of battle orders, and performance levels of commanders and formations in two opposing armies. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) was in combat more than five times within a period of fifteen years. No tactical combat doctrine was applied in the Peace for Galilee War because there was no such doctrine. The approach to lesson-learning was inherently fragmented: Instead of studying the outcome of the war and analyzing overall, territorial command, and sectorial efforts, the fighting was reviewed on a corps or professional disciplinary basis. In the Six Day War the military command showed a high level of techno-tactical professionalism, but only a few commanders in the war displayed real expertise and tactical ability. In the Yom Kippur War it was clear that the senior IDF ground forces command lacked expertise and tactical ability.
