ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses whether emotions are the basis of value. In particular, it examines the possibility of a sentimentalist meta-ethics. First, an account of conceptual sentimentalism is presented. Four motivations for sentimentalism are laid out. Classical and neo-sentimentalist forms are then contrasted with each other. Three further reasons for neo-sentimentalism are offered. First, central features of evaluative content are grounded in emotions. Second, it offers the best account of deep disagreement. Third, the regulative role of emotion terms fits well with the neo-sentimentalist account. Three objections are then presented. The first argues that the neo-sentimentalist cannot answer what it means for a particular emotional response to be appropriate. Second, the account appears circular. Third, it does not seem as though there is any role for the emotion to play in evaluative judgment on a sentimentalist account. The chapter concludes by offering a possible response to these worries for the neo-sentimentalist, including options like “realist sentimentalism” that abandon some of sentimentalism’s traditional commitments.
