ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the role that emotions play in becoming a more virtuous person. The chapter presents the two leading views of the role of emotion in the development of moral virtue. First, the Aristotelian position is presented as one where the emotions play a crucial role in the development of virtue. Second, the Stoic position is presented as one where emotion is contrary to virtue and so acting virtuously requires silencing one’s emotions. Next the Kantian position is presented as a neglected middle ground between the Stoics and the Aristotelians. Two case studies are then presented to assess how each position fares. The first, focusing on compassion, tells against the Stoic view and in favor of the Aristotelian and Kantian views. The second looks to disgust and appears to offer a piece of evidence for the Stoic and Kantian views and against the Aristotelians. Next the chapter shifts focus to emotion’s role in epistemic virtues, looking in particular at the role that curiosity and anxiety might play in epistemic virtues like inquisitiveness and conscientiousness. Finally, the chapter concludes with some worries that the cultivation of emotion may not be possible and may be actively harmful.
