ABSTRACT
Dennett has asserted that first-person science of consciousness is a discipline with no methods, no data, no results, no future, no promise. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. To understand what phenomenology can deliver, and how it might be employed and applied in empirical science, we first need to understand the methodology that defines phenomenological stance or attitude. In Consciousness Explained, for instance, Dennett criticizes phenomenology for employing an unreliable introspectionist methodology and argues that it has failed to find a single, settled method that everyone could agree upon. A strict naturalism denies existence of a unique philosophical method, and claims that philosophers should consider their own work to be directly continuous with natural sciences. The chapter briefly reviews some recent proposals about how phenomenology can work with science rather than in opposition to it.
