Introduction

Expositors of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’ philosophy sometimes characterize his definition of necessity as “traditional.” This chapter begins by considering views on the concept of necessity advanced by certain of his philosophic predecessors which in fact anticipate in various ways his own position. It aims to indicate the extent to which Leibniz’ doctrine does incorporate or reflect established tradition, and the extent to which it involves original developments. The chapter examines the conflict between Leibniz’ reductionistic and formalistic views and the opposing intuitionism and anti-reductionism of his seventeenth century contemporaries, Rene Descartes and John Locke. It explores the arguments which Leibniz offers in opposition to the conventionalistic views expounded by Thomas Hobbes and Locke. The chapter offers some brief observations on the distinction between necessary and contingent truths as it appears in the total context of Leibniz’ philosophical system.