ABSTRACT
This chapter explains the ideal of the intellectually dependable person that is the focus of the book and argues that the virtues of intellectual dependability would make a distinctive contribution to this ideal if they exist. The kind of intellectual dependability with which the book is concerned is a distinctively personal kind of dependability that is pertinent to cases in which we depend on other persons as members of the community of inquiry in our pursuit of epistemic goods. So understood, the ideal is not exhausted by features such as being a reliable source of true beliefs or being broadly knowledgeable or skilled. Rather, by contrasting this ideal with the ideal of the expert, it becomes apparent that achieving this ideal distinctively requires possession of the intellectual virtues. While all intellectual virtues are necessary for a person to reach the full ideal of intellectual dependability, it is argued that if there are virtues of intellectual dependability which are distinctively concerned with promoting others’ epistemic goods, these would make an especially salient contribution to the ideal.
