ABSTRACT
This chapter, broadly covering the period 1963–1965, starts by looking at the policies of the Ba'ath government that came to power after Qasim in relation to the Iraqi Kurds. It will examine how it reneged on its promises given to the Kurds to be granted self-rule. Similarly, it will demonstrate that the US saw the end of Qasim’s regime to be a positive development in the Cold War and its associated regional politics, and it continued to turn down Kurdish petitions for US backing, while offering a symbolic sympathy to the Kurds. UK’s and others’ role in blocking Soviet attempts to raise the issue of genocide in Kurdistan under the Ba'ath at the UN will also be studied here. Following on from these, tensions between Iran, under the Shah, and Nasserism and Nasser, will be assessed with their implications for the Kurds, in addition to Israel’s interests in the Kurdish War. Lastly, an overview of the US global policy is presented from Kennedy to Johnson to demonstrate how the US Iraqi Kurdish policy was in line with its broader Cold War policies and positions. Overall, essentially, this chapter examines different actors' interests in the Iraqi Kurds, with the nature of those interests and the reasons behind them, the Cold War and the regional political framework to consequently show how these impacted upon the Iraqi Kurds’ aspirations, and often lives.
