ABSTRACT
This chapter, broadly focussing from 1965 to 1971, demonstrates how the US continued to view the Kurdish Issue in Iraq, and the Kurds’ appeals to the US, in the context of the Cold War and its associated regional politics. It then examines the reasons behind Iran’s supportive attitude towards the Kurdish movement in Iraq in that period and the interests of the actors involved. It establishes that the US was looking at a Kurdish victory in Iraq ominously while President Nasser of Egypt and the Shah of Iran each sought to essentially enlist the Iraqi Kurds to be used against the interests of the other side. It will argue that the Shah of Iran did not have bona fide interest in the Iraqi Kurds winning self-rule in Iraq but it merely exploited their movements to serve Iran’s interest. Nasser’s relations with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership were based on similar calculations. The chapter also shows how human or liberal values had no influence on how the US saw the Kurdish Issue in Iraq. Further, the return of the Ba'ath Party to power in 1968, their paranoia, Soviet pressures on the Ba'ath to reach a deal with the KDP, culminating in the March 11, 1970 Accord, and Iran’s strong objections to this Accord are analysed together with Israel’s position on the Accord. Lastly, the implications of Britain’s withdrawal on the Iraqi Kurds and on the relations of the concerned states are covered.
