ABSTRACT
The Conclusion restates the objectives and particular approach of this cultural sociological study which focuses on understanding instead of pathologizing contemporary conspiracy culture. It firstly summarizes the main findings and elaborates further on the most crucial component in the understanding of conspiracy culture, namely the contested status of mainstream epistemic institutions and the knowledge they produce. I argue that these historical developments feed on a cultural logic, a hermeneutic of suspicion which is characteristic of conspiracy culture but has a broader intellectual history that I discuss in more detail. These three topics all direct attention to the fact that objective or unequivocal truths (as offered by these institutions) have become for many people quite implausible today. The truth of any situation is now always contested. Based on my analyses of the Dutch conspiracy milieu, I contrast two ideal-typically opposed ways to deal with the difficulty of living in an age of epistemic instability, a historical context where the truth can no longer be guaranteed by one epistemic authority, institution, or tradition, while its consequential relativism and ambivalence cannot fully be embraced either. It is with that topic, by situating conspiracy culture in an age of epistemic instability, that this study is concluded.
