ABSTRACT
In this final section of the book, I introduce the next three chapters that focus specifically on law: two chapters on the basis for law in relation to privacy; and one on what are termed the “wrongful birth” cases. Rather than drawing on traditional jurisprudence, I employ feminist philosophical approaches, mainly those discussed in the first two sections of this book – on feminist relational ontology, and on social contract theory – to analyse legal problems. In addition, I draw on Spinoza’s Ethics. While I do not have a separate section on Spinoza in this book, the framework in his Ethics cuts across much of my work, as illustrated in this section by the chapter that applies his Ethics as a guide to common law judges as to which material should be kept private and which should be publicised. I also consider the extent to which there is overlap between the three sections of the book, focused on the way that subalterns have been treated as monstrous aberrations of norm.
