ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at various formulations relativism can take, or, in other words, at different models that has been, or may be, offered to make sense of relativist intuitions and motivations. Given the problems with the dialetheist rendering of relativism, one possibility might be that of continuing to make use of some paraconsistent logic, just one that is a little weaker than dialetheism. The chapter discusses a number of plausible formulations of the concept of relativism and its underlying logic, semantics, and ontology, and has found all of them unsatisfactory. The required extensive departures from more orthodox views regarding semantics and truth may make one hesitate to go down that route. A realist subvaluationist might suggest that P and not-P are true in different actual and contradictory worlds, each of which “goes its own way”, so to speak, because there are contradictory though non-conjoinable truths.
