ABSTRACT
Conceptual relativism is a narrowly delineated form of relativism inspired by the idea that the world does not present itself to us ready-made or ready-carved. This chapter examines the stronger versions where facts and the world are relativized. The more prevalent approach to conceptual relativism within analytic philosophy has been based on the adoption of a holistic account of concepts. Hans Johann Glock has argued that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later writings, while unsympathetic toward alethic relativism, were supportive of conceptual relativism. Glock ties Wittgenstein’s conceptual relativism to his notion of “grammar”. “Grammar” for Wittgenstein goes beyond the common or garden use of the word and includes more fundamental rules of syntax, logic, and pragmatic conventions, that is, rules that determine what makes sense to say. Wittgenstein’s own writings offer a number of arguments against the hypothesis that different practices are sufficient to give rise to different and incommensurable concepts.
