ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the most important strands of factual relativism, focusing on the variety that fall under the general heading of social constructivism. Relativism ensues if, in addition, it is maintained that different, incompatible scientific constructs have equal standing or validity. Bruno Latour has come to express serious concerns over the irrationalist consequences of both relativism and some versions of constructivism. Latour’s original version of social constructionism delivers a strong form of relativism about science. The chapter discusses a particularly strong version of conceptual relativism, which claims that facts and even worlds are construed through the medium of conceptual schemes, languages, or humanly epistemic categories and epistemic practices. Philosophical defenses of linguistic constructivism often begin with the idea that language is not just a tool for describing or representing the world but has a determining role in shaping our ontology. In Richard Rorty’s Darwinian view of language, words can be seen as tools used for specific purposes.
