ABSTRACT
Relativism about science holds that incompatible scientific positions, theories, and approaches can have equal standing, each relative to different paradigms or methodological frameworks that have given rise to them. This chapter examines some key arguments used to motivate and support relativism about science. It focuses on two specific attempts at using these arguments to undermine objectivist and “absolutist” conceptions of science: the Strong Programme of the sociology of science and some versions of feminist epistemology. The central idea in Thomas Kuhn’s conception of the history of science is that during periods of normal science, theorizing, research, and discovery take place within specific research paradigms. Paul Feyerabend too rejected the claim that there is cumulative progress in science. Relativism about science, particularly the versions inspired by Kuhn and Feyerabend, is also influenced by the view that all observations are theory-laden. Democratic relativism is a plea for intellectual and political tolerance and a denunciation of dogmatism both in science and in politics.
