ABSTRACT
Hegel’s main work in moral philosophy, Philosophical Outlines of Justice, or Natural Law and Political Science in Outline (1821, ‘Rph’), has been condemned as totalitarian, because, e.g., Hegel rejected atomistic individualism, the social contract and open democratic elections. The assumption that Hegel’s rejection of these views results in totalitarianism rests on dichotomies Hegel criticized and rejected. Hegel belongs to the classical or civic republican tradition and espouses collective liberalism, as do Rousseau, T.H. Green and Dewey. This chapter reviews some theoretical context of Hegel’s moral philosophy, characterises the forms of freedom Hegel examines – these are legal, personal, moral and social freedom – and then summarises the structure of Hegel’s Outlines. Hegel’s account of social freedom is elucidated by considering role obligations; then his accounts of individual autonomy and his quest for social reconciliation are considered, along with why Hegel thinks they are complementary. The conclusion sketches the plans and prospects of this study.
