ABSTRACT
Re-examining ‘Modern’ moral epistemology (seventeenth – nineteenth century, C.E.) shows how much of the contemporary agenda in moral epistemology was set then, and how in some important regards unlikely philosophical allies: Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, made greater contributions than are familiar today. One virtue of moral philosophy in this period is that it includes both ethics and justice as its proper species, and it often includes philosophy of education as its proper appendix. Sophisticated versions of many genre of moral philosophy were developed: natural law morality, common sense morality, rationalist teleological theories (perfectionism), moral sentiment theories, moral consensus theories, utilitarianism, social contract theories, conservatism, varieties of moral constructivism and a neglected species which may be called ‘natural law constructivism’. Prompted by issues of war and peace, international trade, scepticism and relativism, Grotius (1625) argued, contra sceptics and relativists, that natural law morality obligates us independently of theism or theology. The period is pervaded by permutations of Socrates’ question to Euthyphro about, e.g., whether an action accords with right reason (orthos logos) because it contributes to achieving the highest moral good, or instead whether an action contributes to achieving the highest moral good because is accords with right reason. More severe than Chisholm’s ‘Problem of the Criterion’ and Williams’ ‘Aggripan Trilemma’, this period is also pervaded by concern with the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion, which highlights crippling difficulties inherent in foundationalism, coherentism, self-evidence and dogmatism. This Dilemma can be resolved, Hegel recognized, by Kant’s Critical account of rational judgment and justification in non-formal domains, including morals. ‘Natural Law Constructivism’ shows that strictly objective basic moral principles can be identified and justified rigorously, without appeal to moral realism (pro or contra) and without appeal to moral motivation or to sentiments.
