ABSTRACT
This chapter covers the discussions concerning the different dimensions and methods of the Cuba policy that took place within the Kennedy administration when it tried to find the most accurate alternatives, and its decision to work along multiple paths. During the work sessions of the Standing Group of the National Security Council—from April 23 to May 28—the group came to the conclusion that all the courses of action proposed by McGeorge Bundy in his memorandum of April 21 were extraordinarily unpromising. Although the consensus was in favor of an overthrow of the Cuban government with force and its replacement with another one compatible with the interests of the U.S., the political conditions and realities made this option difficult. Therefore the U.S. policy toward the “Cuban problem,” was, and has during the last six decades been, a product based on a “multiple path” policy, where all paths used have had the same objective: They have all sought to dismantle or, at least, contaminate the Cuban revolutionary process.
