ABSTRACT
A large part of the discussion of political obligation in the following chapters is based upon an examination of the uses of concepts that figure prominently in the practice. We will analyze uses of “obligation” itself, of “rule,” “authority,” “reason,” “freedom,” “consent,” and a number of other concepts. Use of this approach to understanding a political practice rests on a number of assumptions concerning language and its relationships to thought, action, society, and other “realities.” The purpose of this chapter is to identify some of these assumptions as they are understood here and as they will operate in the chapters that follow. The matters we will discuss in this chapter are controversial and there is a large and sometimes technical literature concerning them. 1 The present discussion is necessarily partial and schematic. Its primary purpose is to identify the bases of and the limitations upon claims advanced in later chapters. Some of this information can be gleaned from the later discussions themselves, especially by readers familiar with the controversies concerning language and its relevance to philosophy. Readers well versed in these matters, and readers not interested in them, might wish to proceed directly to Chapter Two.
