ABSTRACT
Here, a case will be made for living with non-human life being an exemplary case in the kind of participant-observation, aesthetically informed philosophy hitherto described. What is it about living things, animal or otherwise, which gives them a special ethical quality? And how does this ethical quality fit into the kind of moral learning which has argued for? A particular kind of purposiveness, of existing towards something, will be explored as a possible basis for understanding lives as core to our moral learning. How do we appreciate that which is important to another? How do we incorporate that importance into our own going about the world? Personal stories of life lived with other living things through permaculture will begin to shape this exploration of wisdom and descriptions of the lives lived by specific non-human animals will demonstrate the kinds of purposiveness which are core to moral learning. Classic theories in animal ethics will be analysed in light of the ethical-aesthetic theories which underpin this current exploration. Pain, death, pleasure, fulfilment, reason and reasons, sentience, how should these sway us? An argument will be made here for fringe cases (non-human lives, and even non-animal lives) being particularly important in stretching, testing and informing our moral learning.
