ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I argue that the Doha negotiations have been characterized by dysfunctional interest aggregation. One of the reasons for the permanent deadlock of the Doha Round lies in the WTO members’ failure to effectively manage the complexity of the negotiations. Based on a set of elite interviews with diplomats in Geneva and on quantitative empirical analysis, I argue that coalitions in the WTO Doha negotiations did not have the potential to effectively reduce the negotiations’ excessive complexity. While states created coalitions to voice their ambitious interests, the coalitions were characterized by a loss of coherence over time. They dissolved as the bargaining turned from general statements to individual trade-offs and deals in which certain domestic interests are prioritized while others are sacrificed. Other modes of negotiation complexity reduction turned out to be impracticable in the Doha Round as well, though they are increasingly seen as necessary for future negotiations in the WTO.
