ABSTRACT
Chapter 5 investigates the electoral cost of government transition for anti-system parties by focusing on 21 formations from the Western European context over the period 1945–2017. Using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), the impact of four factors, namely the conduct of the party in the post-incumbency election campaign, the set of institutional rules and practices of the broader context, the type of coalition government and the party’s status within the coalition, is assessed, with the goal of determining under what conditions governmental participation can become an electoral asset or, on the contrary, an electoral liability. In addition, on the grounds of post-QCA case selection, this chapter highlights the interplay between the different causal conditions through a focus on the best typical cases identified by the empirical analyses, the Irish Clann na Poblachta, the French Communist Party, the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn, the Northern League in Italy, and SYRIZA in Greece. This chapter highlights the fact that, in explaining the different electoral fate following the transition to government, a crucial role is played by a party’s capacity to articulate a consistent post-incumbency appeal that is also consonant with the broader set of environmental (and competitive) incentives and constraints.
