ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the distinction between de re and de se thoughts is addressed in order to provide an outline of the results relating to I-thoughts achieved thus far in the Kantian approach. With regard to the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content, the Kantian difference between concepts and intuitions has been partly associated with the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Firstly, the interpretative reading features a number of results that are in contrast to the main points stirring the debate on Kantian non-conceptualism: This chapter dismisses the possibility that intuition has an autonomous function of de re knowledge in support of an interpretative reading labelled “weak conceptualism”. Secondly, a few features of transcendental apperception and I think do seem to anticipate some of the points made by Perry and Recanati concerning the so-called implicit de se thoughts in the specific terms of Transcendentalism. Finally, the problem of self-knowledge in the empirical and transcendental dimension is analysed in order to overcome the kind of dualism between the I of apperception and the I as human being on the basis of a formal reading.
