ABSTRACT
This chapter begins by taking a critical look at the earlier work, at the difficulties to which it gave rise and the criticisms it attracted in order to set out Ronald Dworkin's concerns, to paint the problems arising from his earlier views with which he had later to deal, to understand better his solutions and to examine their originality. Dworkin's legal theory has evolved from his views on a theory known as the plain fact view of law or legal positivism. The claim that Dworkin's account cannot explain the role in legal reasoning of arguments by analogy requires closer examination. Jospeh Raz's argument therefore is that, in order to understand the role of principles in legal reasoning, we need an adequate explanation of the concept of the customary norm, and that nevertheless Hart has provided such an explanation notwithstanding the need to make some adjustments to it. Raz introduces this argument with a discussion of Dworkin's theory of judicial discretion.
