ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the conceptions of conventionalism and pragmatism. Stephen Guest has commented that Nigel Simmonds' argument is an "interesting interpretation of the ideal of conventionalism", but that the arguments that Simmonds presents do not depend on an interpretation of conventionalism which is the same as Ronald Dworkin's. Dworkin employs the distinction between concepts and conceptions that was developed by W. B. Gallie and has been influential with a number of leading philosophers, notably John Rawls. If conventionalism is best viewed as strict conventionalism, then no guidance is offered to judges in hard cases, thus giving a very narrow conception of law. Dworkin completes his project by considering the status of soft conventionalism. For Dworkin it is therefore strict conventionalism that we must test against the dual interpretive constraints of fit and justification. Dworkin paid little attention to theories of legal realism in his previous work or, as he terms it, pragmatism.
