ABSTRACT
This chapter considers Ronald Dworkin's argument that integrity is a distinct political virtue alongside justice and fairness. Having rejected both conventionalism and pragmatism, as candidates for the best interpretation of legal philosopher legal practices Dworkin turns to his preferred account of law as integrity. The chapter discusses his view that legal practice is best explained as a chain of reasoning explicable by analogy with the writing of chain novels. It examines Dworkin views on the role of authorial intention in the law. In that Stanley Fish's critique derives much of its force from his view of the substantive nature of philosopher interpretive judgements, this overlaps with his comments on the objectivity of Dworkin's theory. Fish also makes the point that Dworkin seems to seek independent confirmation of his interpretive judgements, but if an interpretation is grounded in the interpreter's beliefs then it goes without saying that the interpreter believes in his interpretation.
