Introduction

The problem of personal identity has received considerable attention from philosophers for the past three decades. This chapter argues that personal identity is a dynamic concept, i.e., a concept that involves an interpretation of the self as being a diachronic, supervenient 'abstract particular' or 'trope'. Moreover, the self, serving as the basis for the attribution of personal identity to human beings, cannot be understood apart from the influences coming to bear upon it from society in terms of values and customs. The term 'person' is not equivalent to the term 'self'. Neither is 'human being' nor 'human individual' nor 'individual' equivalent to 'person'. The term 'self' refers to the 'character' or 'pattern' or 'narrative identity' that characterizes a particular person. But the term 'self'is not equivalent to the term 'consciousness' because the person bearing a specific self can be aware, to a certain extent, of the nature of its 'character' or 'narrative identity'.