ABSTRACT
If one believes that there are too many problems with a dualistic interpretation of the body-mind relationship and at the same time believes that the person is not merely identical with the physical body and its activities. Then it becomes very difficult indeed to find a philosophical concept that sheds light upon a dependency relationship that allows both relata (body and self) to remain distinct even though one is dependent upon the other. For this reason, it seems natural to turn to the concept of supervenience to provide the necessary structural arrangement described in the preceding sentence, i.e., an asymmetrical dependency relationship with the distinctness of the relata remaining intact. Thomas R. Grimes in his article 'Supervenience, Determination, and Dependency' attempts to make a distinction between determination and dependency – a distinction, he claims, that is not acknowledged by Kim. Kim points out that there is some question about whether the concept of supervenience does involve nonreducibility.
